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In a shocking turn of events, the alleged money laundering operations of the Mahadev booking app went undetected for four years while the app itself was being promoted onlineBollywood A-listers and celebrities. The main reason behind this is the use of ‘only WhatsApp’ phone numbers, which made it difficult for law enforcement agencies to track call details or messages.
The Mahadev app was accused of using an online book betting application to enroll new users, create fake IDs, and launder money through a complex web of benami bank accounts. It operated from a central head office in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and used franchising “panel/branches” to expand its operations. These branches ran call centers and employed a large number of young individuals who were also involved in the know-your-customer (KYC) process of shell accounts.
The Mahadev betting app targeted the lower income group and offered various games, lotteries, and betting options. The games were designed in a way that only benefited the franchises, leading players to incur massive losses after initial gains. The app operated multiple websites and closed groups on chat apps to advertise contact numbers for players to deposit money and make bets. These contact numbers could only be accessed via WhatsApp, making it difficult for authorities to track communication.
The scammers resorted to diversionary tacticsfrequently changing bank accounts and WhatsApp numbers, complicating the detection process. Low-level punters or branch operators would be arrested if an FIR was registered, while the main accused, based in Dubai, remained out of reach of Indian law enforcement agencies.
The promoters of the app, sitting abroad, operated through franchising and employed young individuals for call center operations and KYC procedures. The initial stage of their operations involved training youth in Dubai, who were then sent back to India to open their own panels/branches.
A key arrest in the case was Assistant Sub-Inspector Chandrabhushan Verma, who allegedly handled the final delivery of proceeds to politicians and officials. The ED recovered Rs 65 crore from his residence and revealed that Verma had confessed to his role in the scam. It is said that Verma used his political connections to influence senior officers and pay large monthly bribes.
The case is a glaring example of how money laundering operations can go undetected for years, particularly when scammers utilize technology, encryption, and diversionary tactics to evade authorities’ scrutiny.